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   Abstract 
This paper explores the redistributive impact of Common Agricultural Policy reform with 
reference to the distribution of farming incomes in Scotland.  A measure of redistribution is 
proposed that is based on the change in the absolute value of the Gini coefficient and which 
is valid even though average pre-support farming incomes would be negative.  The 
distribution of support is found to have exacerbated the inequality of farm incomes in 
Scotland in 1999/00.  Moreover, the changes envisaged in the current reform process would 
have had virtually no effect on this negative redistributive outcome.  
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1. Introduction 
‘Income support, which depends almost exclusively on price guarantees, is largely 
proportionate to the volume of production and therefore concentrates the greater part of 
support on the largest and the most intensive farms. … The effect of this is that 80% of the 
support provided by FEOGA is devoted to 20% of farms which also account for the greater 
part of the land used in agriculture.’  (European Commission, 1991, p.2)  
‘Many commentators have observed that a minority of farmers enjoys the benefits of the 
majority of direct payments. The direct payments of the 1992 reform have lost their 
compensatory character over time and have become income payments, raising the question 
of whether the distribution of direct support is optimal.’ (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2002b, p.8)  
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was established with a primary goal of 'securing a 
fair standard of living for the farming community'.  Historically, the principal means of 
support has been through intervention in agricultural commodity markets to maintain the 
prices that farmers receive for their output above world market levels.  However a common 
feature of successive reform packages since the MacSharry Plan of 1992 has been for 
support prices to be cut with farmers receiving (partial) compensation for these cuts by 
means of the payment of direct aids.  This switch towards the use of direct payments would 
have implications for the distribution of farming incomes even if the overall level of 
support remained unchanged.  For a start, direct payments are generally related to crop 
areas or livestock numbers rather than to output levels, which will imply some 
redistribution of support given variation in yield levels across farms.  More fundamentally, 
the use of direct payments enables agricultural support to be targeted in a way that was not 
previously possible while also making the resultant distribution of support more transparent 
and hence open to question.   
The primary goal of this paper is to explore the redistributive impact of the ongoing 
process of CAP reform with reference to the distribution of farming incomes in Scotland.  
The distributional effects of the CAP have previously been considered in an Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) study (OECD, 1999) which 
employs grouped data on gross output, direct payments, market price support and incomes 
in the European Union (EU) in 1995, with the groupings all based on the same ranking of 
farms by gross farm sales.  The study draws the conclusion that total agricultural support 
slightly attenuated the inequality of farming incomes on the basis that the distribution of 
total support was a little less concentrated than that of gross output.  However, this 
conclusion may be misleading given that the use of grouped data does not allow for the 
effects of any re-ranking of farms that may arise from differences between farms in the 
generation of income from sales and in the receipt of benefits from agricultural support 
policies.  Jenkins shows that the failure to take account of re-ranking in the empirical 
analysis of income redistribution can lead to significant biases in estimates of both the 
degree of inequality and redistributive effects. 
Keeney, in a study of Irish agriculture based on individual farm records, 
disaggregates family farm income into direct payments and market-based income where the 
latter includes the benefits derived from market price support.  By means of a 
decomposition of the Gini coefficient of family farm income by income components, 
Keeney demonstrates that the payment of direct aids following the MacSharry reforms led 
to a more equal distribution of family farm incomes than would otherwise have been the 
case.  But it does not necessarily follow that a switch towards the greater use of direct 
payments in place of market price support would have the effect of further reducing 
inequality.1  Moreover the analysis does not serve to provide an explicit characterisation of 
the redistributive properties of the CAP per se.   
In general terms, the redistributive effect of agricultural policy may be defined as 
the difference between the inequality of pre-support and post-support farm household 
incomes.  But the measurement of this effect poses a methodological problem because of 
the incidence of negative farm incomes or losses.  Amiel, Cowell and Polovin note many 
standard aggregative measure of inequality are simply undefined for negative incomes.  But 
even those inequality measures that are defined for both positive and negative incomes may 
not give rise to well-behaved measures of redistribution if pre-support incomes are negative 
on average.  In particular, the Gini coefficient G, which is the standard choice in the public 
finance literature to analyse the redistributive impact of tax and welfare programmes, is not 
suitable for this purpose because the sign of the coefficient is determined by the sign of 
average income.  A second contribution of this paper is to propose a generalisation of the 
standard Gini-based measure of redistributive effect that is valid whether pre-support and 
post-support average incomes are positive or negative.  This measure is decomposed into 
vertical and horizontal components in the manner of Kakwani (1984) to show how the 
distribution and scale of support determine the size of the redistributive effect given the 
distribution of pre-support income.   
The paper is organised as follows.  The next section introduces the measures that 
are used to characterise and quantify the redistributive effects of agricultural policy.  
Section 3 sets up the empirical application by considering the data issues involved in the 
                                                 
1 For example, consider the use of deficiency payments to partially replace a market price support scheme 
such that the two transfer mechanisms are operationally equivalent with benefits strictly proportional to 
revenues in both cases.  As a result, the distribution of farming income will not change, but market-based 
income will become more unequally distributed if farming is subject to decreasing average costs.  Indeed, the 
greater the proportion of total revenue accounted for by the deficiency payments, the more unequal the 
distribution of market-based income becomes and the greater the apparently 'equalising' effect of the 
deficiency payments.   
construction of both the distributions of pre-support and post-support Scottish farming 
incomes.  Baseline results are presented showing the redistributive impact of the CAP in 
1999/00, the last farm accounts year before the beginning of the phased introduction of the 
Agenda 2000 reforms, when average family farm income on full-time commercial farms in 
Scotland was just £11650 per farm in spite of direct payments of £26300 per farm (Scottish 
Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department (SEERAD)) and the support of 
agricultural commodity prices above world market levels.  Section 4 explores the 
distributional implications of the ongoing process of CAP reform by means of a counter-
factual analysis of what the impact of the reforms would have been if they had been fully 
implemented in 1999/00.  The final section offers a summary and some brief concluding 
remarks in the light of the empirical findings. 
 
2.  Measurement of the redistributive effect of agricultural support policy 
Following Musgrave and Thin, the overall redistributive effect of a farm income 
support programme could be measured by an index R defined as the difference between the 
Gini coefficients of pre-support and post-support income, G0 and G1 respectively.  
Kakwani (1984) shows that R may be written as the sum of vertical and horizontal equity 
components: 
R = G0  – G1 = [G0  – C1] + [ C1  – G1] =  V + H  (1) 
where C1 is the concentration index obtained when post-support incomes are ranked by pre-
support income.2  The vertical component V = [G0  – Cb] [b/(1+b)] provides a measure of 
gross redistributive effect, which is itself determined by the progressivity and scale of 
                                                 
2 C1 is defined in relation to the concentration curve obtained by plotting cumulative post-support income 
against the cumulative proportion of the population ranked by pre-support income in the same way that G is 
defined in relation to the ordinary Lorenz curve (see Lambert).  Note that C1 = G1 if the ranking of farms by 
pre-support and post-support incomes is identical.  
programme benefits where Cb is the concentration coefficient of benefits ranked by pre-
support income3 and b is the ratio of average benefits to average pre-support income.  
Progressivity is captured by the Kakwani (1977) disproportionality index P = [G0  – Cb], 
which measures the extent to which the average rate of programme benefits falls or rises 
with pre-support incomes.  P is positive (negative) if support is progressive (regressive) 
such that the poorest farmers receive a larger (smaller) share of benefits than of pre-support 
income and equals zero if the average benefit schedule is proportional.  For any given P, 
the gross redistributive effect is proportional to the scale of benefits s = [b/(1+b)], 
measured as the ratio of average benefits to average post-support income.  The horizontal 
component H is the re-ranking index due to Atkinson, Plotnick, which captures the effect 
of changes in the ranking of farms between the pre- and post-support income distributions.  
H is non-positive by definition, implying that any re-ranking that does occur has a negative 
impact on the overall redistributive effect of the programme.  
However, problems with this approach to the measurement of the redistributive 
effect arise if average pre-support income is negative.  In this case G0 will be negative and 
R no longer provides a valid measure of the change in inequality.  If average post-support 
income is also negative then positive values of R= G0 – G1 would have to be taken to imply 
that inequality has increased not decreased.  Whereas if average post-support income is 
positive then R must be non-positive due to the change in the sign of average income, 
whether or not the policy increases the inequality of income.  These problems with R also 
carry over into the decomposition of the index.  Most obviously, R = V in the absence of re-
ranking, so V will exhibit the same failings as R.  Moreover, if average post-support income 
is negative then H no longer provides a valid measure of the re-ranking effect since the 
                                                 
3 Cb is defined analogously to C1.  Note that Cb will be negative (positive) if farmers with low pre-support 
incomes receive a larger (smaller) share of support than those with high ones, and will equal zero for a 
universal flat-rate benefit. 
Lorenz curve for post-support income will lie above the corresponding concentration curve 
such that G1< C1<  0.  Hence, H = C1 - G1 > 0, but the re-ranking effect must be non-positive, 
whatever the overall redistributive effects of the programme (Atkinson).   
These problems arise because the sign of the Gini coefficient is determined by the 
sign of average income (Amiel, Cowell and Polovin).  Indeed the sign of G merely reflects 
whether average income is positive or negative, as is evident from the definition of G as the 
average absolute difference between all distinct pairs of incomes in the population, 
expressed as a proportion of average income: 




−
−
= ∑∑
= =
n
i
n
j
ji |yy|)n(ny
G
1 112
11  (2) 
where yi is the income of individual i (i=1,…n) and y  is average income.  Accordingly this 
paper proposes a generalised index of redistributive effect R′= |G0| – |G1| based on the 
difference between the absolute values of the two Gini coefficients,4 which may be 
decomposed in the manner of Kakwani (1984) to yield:  
R′ = I0G0 – I1G1 = [I1(G0 – C1) + (I0 – I1)G0] +[I1(C1 – G1)]  = V′ +  H′ (3) 
where I0 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if average pre-support income is positive and -1 
otherwise, and I1 is defined likewise for post-support income.  R′, V′= I1V + (I0 – I1)G0 and 
H′= I1H can be seen to generalise the standard indices R, V and H given that (3) yields (1) 
as a special case when both pre-support and post-support average incomes are positive.  
Two other cases are of interest.   
The first case is if both average pre-support and post-support incomes are negative.  
R′, V′ and H′ will simply equal minus R, V and H respectively, with the reversals of sign 
                                                 
4 The treatment of |G| as a measure of inequality follows naturally from the identification of the degree of 
inequality with twice the area bounded by the line of perfect equality and the Lorenz curve, whether the curve 
lies above or below the diagonal.   
restoring the standard properties and interpretations of these measures.  Formally, the 
results are comparable to those of imposing a tax on (positive) income, with flat-rate 
support increasing inequality if not generous enough to make incomes positive on average. 
The more relevant case for agricultural policy analysis is if average pre-support 
income is negative but average post-support income is positive.  Under these conditions the 
sole difference between the standard and generalised indices is due to the additional term 
(I0 – I1)G0 =- 2G0  > 0 in V′, which accounts for the effects of the change in the sign of G as 
a result of the change in the sign of average income.  By definition, positive (negative) 
values of the generalised vertical index V′ continue to imply that support will reduce 
(increase) inequality in the absence of re-ranking.  Moreover H′=H will be non-positive.   
To consider the redistributive effects of support in this case, it is useful to examine 
first the impact of a hypothetical programme under which benefits are paid to farmers in 
proportion to losses incurred while those making profits are taxed at the same rate.  P = 0 
since transfers are proportional to pre-support incomes and R′= 0 since the absolute value 
of the Gini coefficient is invariant to the scaling of incomes, but the policy completely 
inverts the rank order with the generalised vertical and re-ranking indices, V′  and H′, 
exactly cancelling out.   
Now if benefits are progressive instead then P > 0 but R′ will be unambiguously 
negative, implying that the level of inequality will increase if those with the largest losses 
get a disproportionately large share of support and the level of support is high enough for 
average post-support income to be positive.  The reason for this counter-intuitive result is 
that a progressive support policy not only reverses the rank ordering, as was the case with 
equiproportional transfers, but is even more generous to those with the most negative pre-
support incomes.   
Finally, if support is regressive then the sign of R′ will depend both on the 
regressivity and scale of the support, where it should be noted that the average support ratio 
s is high for levels of support that are only just sufficient to turn average income positive 
and tends to one for arbitrarily high levels of support.  With a mildly regressive support 
scheme, such as a system of flat-rate benefits payable to all farmers for which P = G0  < 0, 
then the redistributive effect R′ will be negative at levels of support below which s> 2G0 /P, 
but positive at higher levels of support since any initial differences in income will cease to 
matter if the transfers are large enough.  As the regressivity of the support increases, i.e. as 
P becomes more negative, then the scale of transfers required to secure a reduction in 
inequality will also increase.  And if the support is so regressive that the distribution of 
support is more unequal than the distribution of pre-support income, i.e. Cb > |G0|, then 
inequality will increase whatever the level of support.   
The normative significance of V′ and H′ is revealed by using a welfare index 
W= ( )|G|y −1  in the spirit of Sen.  Let W1 be welfare in the post-support income 
distribution and let WE be welfare under a hypothetical policy of proportional benefits 
equal in total value to the actual support programme.  Then: 
( ) ( )( )HVbyRbyWW E ′+′+=′+=− 11 001  (4) 
where 0y  is average pre-support income.  The (negative) re-ranking term H′ takes away 
from any welfare superiority of the actual benefit schedule over a distributionally neutral 
one.  
 
3. Farm income redistribution in Scotland, 1999/00 
To examine the redistributive impact of agricultural policy on farming incomes in Scotland, 
the distribution of farms by both pre-support and post-support farming income is 
constructed using individual farm record data extracted from the Scottish Farm Accounts 
Survey (FAS) for 1999/00 and raising factors calculated from the June Agricultural Census 
returns on the distribution of agricultural holdings in Scotland by type of farming and size 
of business in 1999.  The FAS is a representative survey of about 500 full-time commercial 
farms carried out each year on behalf of the Scottish Executive (SEERAD).5  It provides a 
wide range of physical and financial data, including detailed information on crop areas, 
livestock numbers, quotas, production, sales, revenues, subsidies and costs, which allows 
for the identification of policy benefits.  Given a population of around 17,500 full-time 
farms in Scotland, the sampling fraction for each farm size and type is approximately 3 per 
cent.   
Farming income is measured by Family Farm Income (FFI), which represents the 
return to the farm’s own capital and all unpaid labour (farmers and spouses, non-principal 
partners and directors and their spouses and family workers) based on the actual tenure and 
indebtedness of the farm business.  FFI is thus a measure of farm business income with the 
distribution of FFI per holding providing ‘an important guide to the existence and locations 
of holdings generating small amounts of income for their occupiers’ (Hill, p.43).  The FAS 
does not provide sufficient information on either non-farm sources of farm household 
income or farm household composition to support a broader analysis of the distributional 
impact of the CAP on the overall welfare of the agricultural community.  
                                                 
5 The sampling frame excludes very small farms (less than 8 Economic Size Units (ESU)), very large 
specialist livestock units (greater than 200 ESU), and certain minor farm types. 
Pre-support FFI is defined as (post-support) FFI less that part of gross policy 
transfers that is estimated to accrue to farm occupiers as owners of factors of agricultural 
production.  This approach recognises that farm occupiers may not be the ultimate 
beneficiaries of farm support programmes (Floyd) and, in particular, allows for the 
effective incidence of support to vary depending on the way in which that support is 
provided (OECD, 2002b).  The analysis thereby serves to identify the contribution of 
support to the inequality of post-support farming incomes, but it does not allow for the 
impact of agricultural policy on the distribution of pre-support incomes.  To do so would 
require a model of the impact on individual farm incomes of adjustments in both farm 
production choices and the state of agricultural input and output markets in response to 
agricultural policy changes.  However it seems unlikely that the results of such an 
equilibrium displacement modelling exercise would be robust given the magnitude of the 
changes that would be entailed by the complete abolition of support for agriculture 
(Gardner).  
Three types of policy instrument are identified in the analysis.  With respect to 
market price support measures, estimates are taken from the OECD PSE database (OECD, 
2001) of the gap between the EU domestic market and border prices for the main 
agricultural commodities, measured at the farmgate level.  These estimates are adjusted to 
reflect the difference between United Kingdom (UK) and EU average producer prices and 
then used to calculate the impact of market price support in terms of inflating both the 
value (net of direct payments, grants and other subsidies) of observed output quantities and 
the cost of purchased feed and seed inputs.  Direct payments are explicitly identified in the 
FAS and cover payments under the various CAP commodity regimes, voluntary set-aside 
schemes and the UK Hill Livestock Compensatory Allowances scheme.  But account is 
also taken of the implicit loss in revenues resulting from the obligatory set-aside 
requirements under the Arable Area Payments scheme (AAPS) in calculating the net value 
of these payments.  Finally, the value of other grants and subsidies includes all other 
payments to farmers except for those in respect of permanent improvements.  
The net economic benefit to farmers of these transfers will depend on the extent to 
which the transfers result in increased returns to the farm-owned factors of production, 
including management, and hence in increased farming incomes.  The effect on farming 
income of a unit increase in output revenues, whether due to market price support, output 
payments or a reduction in set-aside requirements, is estimated as the combined cost share 
of the farm-owned factors of production, while that of a unit increase in direct payments, 
grants or subsidies to individual inputs (i.e. land and livestock) is simply calculated as the 
farm-owned share of those inputs.  Estimates of factor cost shares are obtained on the 
assumption that Scottish agriculture may be characterised by an aggregate Cobb-Douglas 
production technology exhibiting constant returns to scale.  Allowing for fixed farm-
specific and year-specific effects, the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas production function 
are estimated from an unbalanced panel of observations formed from the FAS samples for 
1995/96 through 1999/00 (Roberts, Phimister and Gilbert).  This yields shares for total 
labour, land and buildings, livestock capital, and all other purchased inputs of 15.2%, 9.5%, 
8.6%, and 41.4% respectively.  With these attributable costs accounting for 74.8% of total 
revenue, the residual 25.2% is identified as the return to the farmer’s (fixed) management 
input.  Farm-owned shares of factors of production are derived for each farm in the FAS 
sample, with 81.0% of labour, 58.4% of land and buildings and 100% of livestock capital 
being supplied on average by farm occupiers in 1999/00.  Hence the average net benefit to 
farmers of an extra £1 of market price support or output-related payments; AAPS or other 
area-related payments; livestock headage payments, subsidies or grants; and purchased 
input subsidies would have been £0.517, £0.584, £1 and £0 respectively.  
 Table 1.   The redistributive effects of the CAP 
Policy Scenario  CAP Agenda             Mid-Term Review 
  1999/00  2000 Commun  legislative final 
    -ication proposals agreement 
  Average £ per farm in 1999/00 
(Post-support) FFI   11656 13368 10142 10913 11422 
% of farms with post-support FFI<0  23.9% 20.6% 25.2% 22.7% 24.0% 
Total transfers   40132 38914 35131 35309 36439 
     Of which due to:- Market price support 14216 7314 6820 5267 6597 
 (Net) direct payments 23699 29383 26093 27825 27625 
 Other grants and subsidies 2217 2217 2217 2217 2217 
Total net benefit to farmers  30119 31831 28606 29377 29885 
     Of which due to:- Market price support 7637 3897 3567 2774 3531 
 (Net) direct payments 20723 26176 23280 24845 24596 
 Other grants and subsidies 1758 1758 1758 1758 1758 
Pre-support FFI   -18464 -18464 -18464 -18464 -18464 
% of farms with pre-support FFI <0  87.4% 87.4% 87.4% 87.4% 87.4% 
............................................................................................................................................................... 
Gini coefficient for post-support FFI G1 0.939 0.839 1.021 0.958 0.936 
Gini coefficient for pre-support FFI G0 -0.605 -0.605 -0.605 -0.605 -0.605 
Concentration coeff. of post-support FFI  C1 0.458 0.338 0.514 0.464 0.445 
Concentration coeff. of total net benefits   Cb -0.193 -0.209 -0.208 -0.208 -0.204 
Index of redistributive effect  R′ -0.335 -0.234 -0.417 -0.353 -0.332 
Index of vertical redistribution V′ 0.146 0.267 0.090 0.141 0.160 
  Of which due to:-      
    Departures from proportionality I1V -1.062 -0.942 -1.119 -1.069 -1.049 
    Changed sign of average income (I0-I1)G0 1.209 1.209 1.209 1.209 1.209 
Index of re-ranking H′ -0.481 -0.501 -0.507 -0.494 -0.492 
Disproportionality of net benefits from: -      
                total support  P -0.411 -0.396 -0.397 -0.397 -0.401 
                market price support   -0.559 -0.563 -0.551 -0.529 -0.556 
                (net) direct payments  -0.350 -0.364 -0.366 -0.375 -0.372 
                Other grants & subsidies  -0.496 -0.496 -0.496 -0.496 -0.496 
Average net benefit ratio s 2.584 2.381 2.820 2.692 2.617 
    Of which due to:- market price support 25.4% 12.2% 12.5% 9.4% 11.8% 
                                   (net) direct payments 68.8% 82.2% 81.4% 84.6% 82.3% 
 other grants & subsidies 5.8% 5.5% 6.1% 6.0% 5.9% 
 The first column of figures in Table 1 presents findings on the distributional impact 
of the CAP in 1999/00.  In that year, the average level of FFI per farm was just £11656 in 
spite of market price support worth £14216, (net) direct payments of £23699 and other 
grants and subsidies totalling £2217.  In practice farmers do not receive the full benefit of 
these transfers so the total impact of agricultural support on average family farm income is 
predicted to have been £30119 rather than £40132.  Even so, pre-support FFI would have 
been −£18464 on average with nearly 90 per cent of farms recording losses.  These results 
highlight the chronic dependence of farming on state aid.  
The Gini coefficient for post-support FFI was positive in 1999/00 since average 
farming income was positive, with the value of 0.939 indicative of a high degree of 
inequality.  In contrast, the Gini coefficient for pre-support FFI was negative as pre-support 
FFI was negative.  Comparing the absolute values of the two Gini coefficients, we find that 
the distribution of post-support income was more unequal than that of pre-support income.  
Hence agricultural policy in 1999/00 had a negative redistributive effect on the distribution 
of FFI, with the value of R′ equal to -0.335 or slightly more than half the size of the Gini 
coefficient for pre-support income.    
The decomposition of R′ reveals the factors underlying this negative outcome.  The 
first point to note is that farmers with negative or low pre-support incomes received more 
than an equal share of total benefits, but that their share of benefits was less than their share 
of overall losses.  Hence the distribution of benefits was regressive as is indicated by the 
negative value of the index P.  And the departure-from-proportionality effect I1V = Ps is 
also negative given that average post-support income and hence the ratio of benefits to 
post-support income s was positive.  Nevertheless the scale of benefits was sufficiently 
generous not only to change the sign of average income but also to begin to moderate 
initial differences in farming income.  Thus the index of vertical redistribution V′ is 
positive implying that agricultural policy would have made the distribution of farming 
income slightly more equal were it not for the adverse distributional consequences of re-
ranking as measured by the index H′.   
OECD (2002a) argues that farm support measures do not change the income 
distribution in any significant way because farm support measures are still primarily based 
on production or production factors.  Thus it comes as no surprise that the CAP is 
ineffective as a redistributive tool.  What the study adds to this conventional wisdom is the 
observation that the CAP is also inefficient as a redistributive tool because of the negative 
impact of the re-ranking induced by the operation of the policy.  One likely cause of this 
horizontal inequity is the organisation of the CAP on a commodity basis, with the level of 
support varying across commodities.  However this would not appear to be the sole 
explanation given that results from a disaggregated analysis by farm type (not reported) 
show that the re-ranking index H′ for the agricultural sector as a whole is not consistently 
higher than the comparable indices for individual farm types.  Further work is required to 
resolve this issue.  
 
4. Distributional implications of the current process of CAP reform 
The main thrust of the changes initiated by the agreement in 1999 on the so-called ‘Agenda 
2000’ reforms has been to deepen and widen the 1992 reform of the CAP (European 
Commission, 2002a), with further cuts in the support prices of selected farm commodities 
partially offset by increases in direct payments.  However, Agenda 2000 also saw the 
introduction of the principle of ‘modulation’, which refers to the transfer of money from 
direct payments to a wider range of rural development measures and involves the reduction 
in direct payments to which farmers would otherwise be entitled.  Modulation offers new 
possibilities to improve the targeting of direct payments which the Commission sought to 
exploit in the proposals they put forward in the ‘Mid-Term Review’ (MTR) of Agenda 
2000.  Thus the initial MTR Communication of July 2002 (European Commission, 2002b) 
included proposals both for the exemption of direct payments below a certain level (the so-
called ‘franchise’) from now compulsory EU-wide modulation rates, and for the imposition 
of a maximum threshold on payments per farm.  Following opposition from the UK and 
Germany to the principle of capping, the latter proposal was replaced in the Explanatory 
Memorandum/Legislative Proposals of January 2003 (European Commission, 2003b) by a 
progressive modulation schedule in which the marginal, and hence also the average, 
modulation rate rose with the level of payments to the farm (the so-called ‘system of 
degression’).  However the final agreement of June 2003 (European Commission, 2003a) 
defers the introduction of degression pending the need for financial discipline,6 so that the 
only means by which payments will definitely be targeted in future is through the operation 
of the franchise. 
This study considers the hypothetical impact of the reform process when complete, 
which will not be before 2007/08 according to the MTR final agreement.  Table 2 provides 
details of the main elements of the reform process that are taken into account in the 
analysis.  Note that no allowance is made for the effect of changes in domestic agricultural 
support policies such as the replacement of UK Hill Livestock Compensatory Allowances 
with the Less Favoured Areas Support Scheme.  Nor does the analysis allow for 
behavioural responses to policy changes, so it is unable to capture the possible impact of 
either the modulation-funded expansion of agri-environmental schemes, the proposed 
expansion of milk quotas, or the decoupling of payments that would result from the MTR 
scheme for a single farm income payment.    
                                                 
6 The financial discipline mechanism will be activated if forecast expenditures exceed a preset budgetary 
threshold, leading to a reduction in direct payments and the possible introduction of a system of degression 
over above the franchise mechanism. 
Table 2.   Definition of CAP reform scenarios in terms of changes to CAP of 1999/001 
 Agenda 2000 reform agreement MTR Communication  MTR legislative proposals MTR final agreement5 
Arable crops Cut in cereals support prices 15%
Changes in payment rates:2  
   Cereals/Arable silage + €8.66 /t
   Oilseed rape - €31.24 /t
   Protein crops - €5.99 /t
   Linseed - €42.10 /t
Cut in cereals support prices 20%
Changes in payment rates:2  
   Cereals/Arable silage + €11.66 /t
   Oilseed rape - €28.24 /t
   Protein crops - €2.69 /t
   Linseed - €39.10 /t
Cut in cereals support prices 20%
Changes in payment rates:2  
   Cereals/Arable silage + €11.66 /t
   Oilseed rape - €28.24 /t
   Protein crops - €2.69 /t
   Linseed - €39.10 /t
Cut in cereals support prices 15% 
Changes in payment rates:2  
   Cereals/Arable silage + €8.66 /t 
   Oilseed rape - €31.24 /t 
   Protein crops - €5.69 /t 
   Linseed - €42.10 /t 
Set-aside  Change in payment rate2 + €8.66 /t
 
Change in payment rate2 + €11.66/t
End to non-food crop scheme 
Change in payment rate2 + €11.66/t
End to non-food crop scheme  
Exemption for SPS claims under 20 ha. 
Change in payment rate2 + €8.66 /t 
 
Milk &  
milk products 
Cut in support prices  15%
New milk quota payment €17.24 /t
No specific proposal but options in
carrying on with Agenda 2000 reforms 
‘Global’ cut in support prices 28%
New milk quota payment €32.20 /t
‘Global’ cut in support prices 21% 
New milk quota payment €35.50 /t 
Beef & veal Cuts in beef support prices 20%
Changes in Premium rates: 
   Beef Special:  Steers + €41.3 /head
 Bulls + €75.0 /head
   Suckler Cow 3   + €54.6 /head
   Extensification:4 High + €28 /premium
 Low + €4 /premium
New Slaughter Premium  
 Bulls, steers, cows €80 /head
 Calves €50 /head
End to Calf Processing Aid scheme 
No specific proposal but options in
continuation of Agenda 2000 reforms 
Continuation of Agenda 2000 reforms Continuation of Agenda 2000 reforms 
 
10% of direct payments to be withheld  u
Scottish beef envelope scheme. 
Modulation of  
direct payments 
UK rate 4.5% EU rate 20%
Franchise of €5000 + €3000 per AWU ab
AWU exempt from modulation 
Payments capped at €300000 + franchise 
EU rate on payments:  
    below €5000  0%
    €5000 to €50000   12.5%
    above €50000  19%
Combined EU and Scottish rates 10% 
Franchise of €5000 exempt from modulat
Notes: 
1.  The table lists only those changes within the reform packages that are taken into account in the study.  Neither Agenda 2000 nor the MTR contain proposals for reform of the 
commodity regimes for sheepmeat, pigmeat, poultrymeat or eggs. 
2.  Area payment rates are obtained by multiplying by the cereal reference yield.  The cut in payment rates for non-cereal crops is due to the alignment of all rates with those for cereals.  
MTR payments for protein crops includes the stand-alone supplement of 55.57 € /ha converted using the non-LFA Scotland reference yield. 
3.  Heifers aged 8 months and over may be submitted up to a specified maximum of the total number of cattle on which the premium is claimed. 
4.   The high rate is payable if stocking density is less than 1.4LU/ha (previously 1.0LU/ha) and the low rate if between 1.4 and 1.8 LU/ha (previously 1.0 and 1.4 LU/ha). 
5.   The final agreement provides for certain flexibilities in the operation of policy.  The definition of the scenario takes into account the key decisions of the Scottish Executive on the 
implementation of CAP reform in Scotland (Wilson, 2004). 
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The study explores the possible redistributive impact of the reforms by simulating 
the effect that the reforms would have had on the distribution of FFI in 1999/00, the last 
year before the Agenda 2000 reforms began to be implemented.  The last four columns of 
Table 1 presents the results of this simulation exercise, detailing the effects of the 
hypothetical policy scenarios of full implementation in 1999/00 of the Agenda 2000 
agreement, the initial MTR Communication, the revised MTR legislative proposals and the 
MTR final agreement.  Note that the level of pre-support FFI is identical in all five columns 
since the only differences that are considered are those due to differences in the support 
regimes under the alternative policy scenarios.   
It is predicted that the effect of Agenda 2000 would have been to slightly reduce the 
total level of transfers, as farmers would have received compensation in the form of higher 
direct payments for only 50% of the cuts in market price support and all direct subsidy 
payments would have been subject to modulation at the voluntary UK rate.  But FFI 
increases because the proportion of total support that accrue to farmers in the form of 
returns to farm-owned factors of production is higher for (net) direct payments than for 
market price support.  In contrast, both the MTR Communication and the legislative 
proposals would have led to a fall in average FFI, both in relation to the predicted Agenda 
2000 and the observed 1999/00 levels, due to the sizeable adverse effect on total transfers 
of the proposed modulation arrangements.  The subsequent watering down of the 
modulation proposals in the MTR final agreement benefits farmers, but average income 
levels would have still only be on a par with those actually observed in 1999/00.   
With regard to redistribution, the main finding is that the inequality of post-support 
FFI would have been virtually identical under the MTR Final Agreement to that observed 
in 1999/00, though inequality would have been lower under Agenda 2000 and higher under 
either set of MTR proposals.  These distributional outcomes partly reflect the predicted 
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changes in the scale of net benefits.  In particular, the positive redistributive impact of 
Agenda 2000 is largely driven by the increased scale of net benefits which leads to a 
marked reduction in the proportion of farmers who would have had negative incomes.  But 
the distributional outcomes also reflect specific changes to the CAP that will result from 
the reform process.  Under all four policy scenarios, the effect of the rebalancing of support 
would have been to make the distribution of support less regressive since the distribution of 
(net) direct payments is less regressive than that of market price support.  In contrast, the 
impact of changes to the direct payment schemes themselves would generally have been to 
increase the regressivity of (net) direct payments, with the position actually worse under 
the MTR final agreement than the Agenda 2000 reforms.   
The latter outcome may appear surprising given the Commission’s concern to 
improve the targeting of direct payments in the MTR.  However the operation of the 
franchise would have had negligible impact on the regressivity of (net) direct payments 
with 98.3% of Scottish farms receiving the maximum value of relief available under the 
MTR final agreement.  Moreover, it would appear that the abandoned capping proposal in 
the MTR Communication would also have been largely ineffective with no farms at all in 
the FAS sample subject to this mechanism.  And although the differential modulation rates 
envisaged in the MTR legislative proposals would have had some bite, with 34.3% of 
farms receiving payments subject to the full modulation rate, the redistributive impact of 
degression would have been adverse because net direct payments are negatively correlated 
with pre-support incomes given the dependence of farmers on state aids.   
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5.  Summary and conclusions  
The principal focus of the paper is the measurement of the redistributive impact of the 
CAP.  One possible criticism of such an exercise is that the distribution of agricultural 
policy transfers reflects goals other than income support to do with the environment, 
sustainability and rural development.  However measures specifically targeted to these 
other objectives still only account for a relatively small share of total support, whereas the 
direct payments that were first introduced by the MacSharry reforms of the CAP and now 
account for the bulk of support, had the stated objective of compensating farmers for the 
adverse income effects of cuts in support prices.  The OECD Committee for Agriculture 
(OECD, 1998) has identified equity and targeting as operational criteria for the evaluation 
of agricultural policy. 
In general terms, the redistributive effect of agricultural policy may be defined as 
the difference between the inequality of pre-support and post-support farm household 
incomes.  The paper proposes a measure of redistributive effect, based on the change in the 
absolute value of the Gini coefficient, that is valid whether pre-support and post-support 
average incomes are positive or negative.  The measure is decomposed into vertical and 
horizontal components in the manner of Kakwani (1984) to show how the distribution and 
scale of support determine the size of the redistributive effect given the distribution of pre-
support income.  In particular, it is demonstrated that if average pre-support income is 
negative and the aim of policy is both to secure positive levels of income on average and to 
reduce inequality then support must be regressive, but if support is too regressive then the 
rich will simply get richer.   
The possible redistributive impact of the current process of CAP reform is explored 
by simulating the effect that the proposed reforms would have had on the distribution of 
Family Farm Income in 1999/00.  The results of this counter-factual study need to be 
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interpreted with some care given that the analysis does not allow for the impact of 
agricultural policy on the distribution of pre-support incomes.  Nevertheless the empirical 
findings do serve to indicate that the observed distribution of support in 1999/00 
exacerbated the inequality of family farm incomes (FFI) in Scotland.  Moreover, it would 
appear that the changes envisaged in the MTR final agreement would have had virtually no 
effect on this negative redistributive outcome, with the slight positive vertical redistribution 
effect arising from the rebalancing of support offset by a minor increase in the negative 
horizontal re-ranking effect.  Indeed, if it should prove necessary to invoke the financial 
discipline mechanism then the overall redistributive impact of the current reform process 
might well be adverse.  
The conclusion may reasonably be drawn that the current package of reforms 
represents yet another missed opportunity to exploit the potential of direct payments to 
target support to those most in need of assistance.  This continuing failure may in part be 
attributed to the inherent difficulty of reaching agreement on common EU thresholds for 
the targeting of payments given the considerable differences between the agricultural 
structures of the various member states.  In particular, the UK has a long-standing record of 
opposition to the principle of degression on the basis that a disproportionate share of the 
payments to UK farmers would be subject to the higher rates of modulation.  This 
opposition does not appear to have been assuaged by the MTR agreement that every 
member state receive at least 80% of its modulation funds, rather than those funds simply 
accruing to the EU budget to finance the general expansion of the rural development 
programme and further market reforms as had originally been envisaged in the MTR 
proposals (see Beckett, 2003).  One alternative might be for the EU to establish (common) 
national targets for modulation savings and then allow member states to set their own 
national thresholds for the degression of payments within this framework.   
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 However the more fundamental problem is that the redistribution of agricultural 
income will remain ineffective so long as the overwhelming bulk of support remains tied to 
either current or historical levels of production.  This problem cannot be resolved through 
the degression of existing payment schemes, requiring instead that support be targeted on 
the basis of need if direct income payments are to be delivered to those that policy-makers 
might deem to warrant assistance.  Whether such a redistribution of agricultural income 
support could ever be achieved through reform of the CAP is very doubtful.  But even 
before contemplating such a radical reform one might want to follow the OECD in 
considering whether the general tax and social security system might not in any case be 
better placed ‘to identify low incomes among agricultural households and ensure equal 
treatment vis-à-vis other classes of household’ (OECD, 2002a, p.11). 
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Appendix: Data and documentation 
Farm Accounts Survey panel dataset 
The primary source of data employed in the study is the panel dataset constructed by 
Roberts, Gilbert and Phimister (2002) of farms in the Scottish Farm Accounts Survey 
(FAS) over the period 1995/96 through 1999/00.  The FAS is the principal source of 
microeconomic data on the performance of Scottish agriculture and forms part of the EU’s 
Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN).  FAS data is Crown Copyright and may not be 
provided to any third party nor made public without the prior permission of the Scottish 
Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department (SEERAD).   
The FAS is an annual survey of Scottish farms carried out on behalf of SEERAD.  The 
FAS has a sample of around 500 farms, virtually all of which have accounting years ending 
between the 30th of September and the 31st of May.  The average end of year is early March 
so FAS data on the financial performance of the agricultural sector for the accounting years 
1995/96 through 1999/00 relates approximately to the calendar years 1995 through 1999. 
The farms in the survey are intended to be full-time commercial undertakings where the 
occupier is mainly but preferably wholly engaged in working or managing the farm; they 
should provide work for at least one person; and part-time farms with substantial involvement 
in other associated agricultural activities such as contracting or wholesaling are excluded.  The 
surveyed farms are chosen to be representative of size and type, where size relates to the 
economic size of the business and the type classification of the farm depends on the relative 
importance of the various crop and livestock enterprises (see Table 1).  Individual farm results 
can be weighted according to the number of farms of that type and size enumerated in the 
(annual) June Agricultural Census, to yield statistics for the whole sector.  Given a population 
of around 17,500 full-time farms in Scotland, the sampling fraction for each farm size and 
type is estimated to be approximately 3%.   
Once recruited, farms can stay in the sample for an unlimited period provided they do not 
change so much as to no longer be classified as full-time commercial enterprises.  The 
panel dataset has been constructed by linking data on individual farms in the survey over 
time.  The panel for 1995/96 through 1999/00 contains observations on a total of 657 
different farms, of which 621 were present in two or more years, and 383 were present in 
all five of the years. 
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The information contained in the FAS comprises a wide range of financial and physical 
detail on the farms in the survey. Physical details include such information as area, tenure, 
quotas, labour, stocking, production and sales.  Financial details include data on the 
revenue from the sale of all the main agricultural products and subsidies and also on 
expenditure on costs such as labour, rent, feed, seed and fertilisers. Though not an 
exhaustive list, information is also available on the value of farm products used on the 
farm, and in the farmhouse; the opening and closing valuations of crops, livestock, 
machinery and other items of cost; capital investment and disinvestment in the accounting 
year. 
[More information on the FAS can be found in Farm Incomes in Scotland (online at: 
http://www.scottishexecutive.gov.uk/publications/a_to_z.aspx?letter=F) which provides a 
description of the survey together with summary results] 
 
Table 1.   Farm Accounts Survey sampling frame 
SEERAD Farm Type   Description Size  
(Economic Size Units)  
1.  Specialist Cereals 
UK main farm type 1 
Farms where more than two-thirds of the total standard 
margin comes from cereals and oilseeds 
Small:  8 - 39.9
Medium:  40 - 99.9
Large:  100 and over
2.  General Cropping 
UK main farm type 2 
Other farms where more than two-thirds of the total stan
gross margin comes from all crops.  
Small:  8 - 39.9
Medium:  40 - 99.9
Large:  100 and over
3.  Dairy 
UK main farm type 9, 10 
Farms where more than two-thirds of the total standard 
margin comes from dairy cows. 
Small:  8 - 39.9
Medium:  40 - 99.9
Large:  100 - 199.9
4.  LFA Specialist Sheep 
UK main farm type 11, 14(part) 
Farms in LFAs with more than two-thirds of the total stan
gross margin coming from sheep 
Small:  8 - 39.9
Medium:  40 - 99.9
Large:  100 - 199.9
5.  LFA Specialist Beef 
UK main farm type 12, 14(part) 
Farms in LFAs with more than two-thirds of the total stan
gross margin coming from cattle 
Small:  8 - 39.9
Medium:  40 - 99.9
Large:  100 - 199.9
6.  LFA Mixed Cattle & Sheep 
UK main farm type 13, 14(part) 
Farms in LFAs with more than two-thirds of the total stan
gross margin coming from sheep and beef cattle together.  
Small:  8 - 39.9
Medium:  40 - 99.9
Large:  100 - 199.9
7.  Lowground Cattle & Sheep 
UK main farm type 15 
Farms outside LFAs with more than two-thirds of the 
standard gross margin coming from sheep and beef 
together. 
Small:  8 - 39.9
Medium:  40 - 99.9
Large:  100 - 199.9
8.  Mixed 
UK main farm type 16 - 20 
Farms where no enterprise contributes more than two-thir
the total standard gross margin 
Small:  8 - 39.9
Medium:  40 - 99.9
Large:  100 and over
Notes: 
The sampling frame excludes (specialist) ‘Horticulture’, (specialist) ‘Pigs and Poultry’ and ‘Other’ UK robust farm types. 
The sampling frame excludes farms smaller than 8 Economic Size Units (ESU) and specialist livestock farms (farm types 3 to 
7) larger than 200 ESU: specialist livestock farms larger than 200 ESU were dropped from the dataset.   
 
Calculation of pre-support Family Farm Income (FFI) 
The FAS provides a range of indicators of the economic performance of the sector.  Family 
farm income (FFI) represents the return to the farm’s own capital and all unpaid labour 
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(farmers and spouses, non-principal partners and directors and their spouses and family 
workers) based on the actual tenure and indebtedness of the farm business.  It thereby 
‘accords broadly with the notion of profit from farming’ (Hill, Farm Incomes, Wealth and 
Agricultural Policy, (2nd. Edition) Aldershot: Avebury, 1996) and is used by the European 
Commission in the Farm Accountancy Data Network.  
Pre-support FFI is defined as (post-support) FFI less the benefits that are farmers deemed 
to receive from the operation of the CAP.  The first step in this calculation is to work out 
the size of the transfers due to the three types of policy instrument separately identified in 
the study:  
(i)  Market price support.  Estimates are taken from the OECD PSE database (OECD. 
OECD Agricultural databases: 2001 edition. Paris, 2001) of the gap in 1999 
between the EU15 domestic market and border prices of common wheat, maize, 
barley, oats, other grains, milk, beef and veal, pig meat, poultry meat, sheep meat 
and eggs, measured at the farmgate level.  These commodities account for the 
overwhelming bulk of Scottish agricultural output subject to market price support 
given that oilseeds and protein crops are not subject to border protection, potatoes 
and wool are not covered by the CAP and the FAS sample excludes specialist 
horticultural holdings.  The estimates are adjusted to reflect the difference between 
UK and EU average producer prices using data from the “Agricultural Situation in 
the European Union” report for 2001 (Commission of the European Communities, 
Brussels, 2001).  The resulting price gaps are used to identify the impact of market 
price support in terms of inflating both the value of output, net of direct payments, 
grants and other subsidies, and the cost of feed and seed, as given in the FAS data.   
In the CAP reform scenarios, we adjust the market price support transfer estimates 
for any proposed changes in farm commodity support prices on the assumption that 
cuts in support prices lead to similar percentage falls in domestic producer prices.  
(ii) Direct payments.  Direct payments are explicitly identified in the FAS and cover 
payments under the Arable Area Payment and Small Cereals Producer Schemes, 
set-aside payments, Hill Livestock Compensatory Allowances, Beef Special 
Premium, Suckler Cow Premium, Sheep Annual Premium and payments under the 
Small Milk Producer scheme. We calculate the net value of AAPS payments to 
farmers by subtracting an estimate of the loss in crop revenues due to obligatory 
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set-aside requirements where both the obligatory set-aside area and the level of crop 
returns can be identified from the FAS data. 
In the CAP reform scenarios, we assume that changes in direct payment rates 
impact directly on transfers.  However, working out the possible effects of changes 
to the operational rules governing existing schemes and the introduction of new 
ones is less straightforward.  We assume that the end of the non-food crop scheme 
will lead to the loss of output from the industrial crops grown on set-aside land in 
1999/00.  Exemptions from set-aside for small claims are identified on the basis of 
relevant areas in 1999/00 with the value of the exemption equal to the crop 
revenues that would have been generated on land set-aside.  Farmers are assumed to 
have made claims covering their entire suckler cow premium quota in 1999/00 such 
that the relaxation of the rules to allow heifers to be submitted as part of the claim 
would have had no effect.  Eligibility for the new higher rate of extensification 
premium is deduced from the receipt of extensification premium in 1999/00, while 
eligibility for the new lower-rate is estimated on the basis of actual stocking 
densities in that year.  Eligibility for the new direct payments to milk producers is 
based on the individual reference quantity available on the holding; with no change 
foreseen in the aggregate level of milk quota in Scotland.  The effect of the new 
beef slaughter premium scheme is deemed to be equivalent to an increase in market 
price support, with the percentage increase conservatively estimated as the ratio of 
the premium rate for bull, steers and cows to the average UK price for class R3 
male bovine animals in 1999.  Finally the value of the franchise and degression 
under the various MTR modulation schemes is calculated on the basis of revised 
levels of direct payments and, in the case of the MTR Communication franchise, the 
total number of labour units on the farm in 1999/00.   
(iii) Other grants and subsidies.  Other grants and subsidies are also identified in the 
FAS and cover all other payments to farmers except for those in respect of 
permanent improvements.  These payments are not affected by the proposed 
reforms to the CAP. 
The second step in the calculation is to work out the net economic benefit to farmers of 
these transfers, which will depend on the extent to which the transfers result in increased 
returns to the farm-owned factors of production, including management, and hence in 
increased farming incomes.  The effect on farming income of a unit increase in output 
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revenues, whether due to market price support, output payments or a reduction in set-aside 
requirements, is estimated as the combined cost share of the farm-owned factors of 
production, while that of a unit increase in direct payments, grants or subsidies to 
individual inputs (i.e. land and livestock) is simply calculated as the farm-owned share of 
those inputs as identified in the FAS data.   
 
Estimation of factor cost shares 
Estimates of factor cost shares are obtained on the assumption that Scottish agriculture may 
be characterised by an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production technology exhibiting constant 
returns to scale.   Output is defined as farm output, net of direct payments, grants and other 
subsidies, in constant 1996 prices, where the various components of output are deflated 
using the appropriate UK Index of Producer Prices (online: 
http://statistics.defra.gov.uk/esg/datasets/apiyear.xls).  Production is specified as a function 
of four separate input categories.  ‘Labour’ is defined in physical terms using FAS data on 
total annual labour units.  ‘Land and buildings’ is identified as a separate cost category in 
the FAS data and includes an imputed item for the rental value of owner-occupied land.  
Costs are defined in constant 1996 prices: price deflators are constructed for land costs by 
farm type from the FAS panel data on land costs and areas while the various components of 
building costs are deflated using the relevant UK Index of Purchase Prices of the Means of 
Agricultural Production (online: http://statistics.defra.gov.uk/esg/datasets/apiyear.xls).  The 
value of ‘livestock capital’ is available in the FAS data and is converted into constant 1996 
prices using a price deflator for each livestock type constructed from the FAS panel data on 
opening and closing valuations and quantities.  ‘All other purchased inputs’ encompasses 
the FAS machinery, crop, livestock and miscellaneous cost categories and is expressed in 
constant price terms by deflating individual cost components using the relevant UK Index 
of Purchase Prices of the Means of Agricultural Production.  Finally, the specification 
allows for fixed farm-specific and year-specific effects. 
The parameters of the Cobb-Douglas production function are estimated from the 
unbalanced FAS panel dataset for 1995/96 through 1999/00 using the fixed-effects linear 
regression model estimator ‘xtreg’ in STATA7 (StataCorp, 2001, ‘Stata Statistical 
Software: Release 7.0’, College Station Texas.).  The output is shown below. 
 30
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      2508 
Group variable (i) : shortid                    Number of groups   =       626 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0781                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.8492                                        avg =       4.0 
       overall = 0.8087                                        max =         5 
 
                                                F(8,1874)          =     19.85 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.7201                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       log(output) |     Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
-------------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
       log(labour) |   .1520864    .042736    3.56   0.000    .0682712   .2359015 
   log(land&bldgs) |   .0954522   .0276076    3.46   0.001    .0413073   .1495971 
    log(livestock) |   .0864826   .0363486    2.38   0.017    .0151947   .1577705 
log(oth_purchased) |   .4141415   .0501372    8.26   0.000    .3158109   .5124721 
          _1996/97 |   .0185354   .0166328    1.11   0.265   -.0140854   .0511562 
          _1997/98 |   .0481039   .0159633    3.01   0.003    .0167962   .0794115 
          _1998/99 |   .0468698   .0157111    2.98   0.003    .0160566   .0776829 
          _1999/00 |  -.0068957   .0155707   -0.44   0.658   -.0374334    .023642 
             _cons |   4.513541   .6308414    7.15   0.000    3.276315   5.750766 
-------------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
           sigma_u |  .48851374 
           sigma_e |  .23743846 
               rho |  .80890615   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(625, 1874) =     6.52           Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
The estimated output elasticities imply cost shares for total labour, land and buildings, 
livestock capital, and all other purchased inputs of 15.2%, 9.5%, 8.6%, and 41.4% 
respectively.  With these attributable costs accounting for 74.8% of total revenue, the 
residual 25.2% is identified as the return to the farmer’s (fixed) management input.   
 
Analysis of income redistribution   
The redistributive analysis is based on the farm-level data on (post-support) FFI and the 
farm-level estimates of pre-support FFI and of transfers and net economic benefits by 
policy instrument.  All summary statistics are calculated using weighted data where the 
weights are calculated from information supplied by SEERAD from the June Agricultural 
Census returns on the distribution of agricultural holdings in Scotland by type of farming 
and size of business in 1999. (the ‘Economic Report on Scottish Agriculture 2000 edition’ 
(SEERAD, 2000. Online: http://www.scottishexecutive.gov.uk/agri/documents/ersa-
00.asp) contains a tabulation of this joint distribution, but provides less detail than the 
information on which the study is based).  
 
 31
The various Gini and Concentration coefficients are calculated using the Gini formula 
given in Lerman & Yitzhaki (Journal of Econometrics, 42 (September 1989), pp.43-47) for 
use with weighted data.  Thus to calculate the Gini coefficient G, let wi and yi be the 
weights and incomes in a sample of n observations where Σwi=1 by definition.  Assume 
that the individuals are ranked in order of increasing income and define the empirical 
distribution function F(y) as:  
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)y(F     for i=1,… n;    where w0 = 0. 
The formula for the Gini coefficient G is then equal to: 
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where y  and F are the weighted means of y and F respectively.  In the case of the 
Concentration coefficients of post-support FFI and benefits, C1 and Cb respectively, the 
same formulae are employed but the individuals are ranked not by the variable of interest 
itself but in order of increasing pre-support FFI.   
 
